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the 2008/2009 crisis, this did not mean a fundamental reorientation expressed in changes in the 
main economic conditions such as ownership patterns. Nevertheless, governments in some CEE 
countries seem to fl irt with such ideas too in the general policy of increasing state economic inter-
vention. The privatisation process was stopped and in a number of cases, formerly privatised as-
sets were re-nationalised. Governments strengthened their infl uence in the governance structure in 
mixed-ownership companies. The main body of the present paper provides a better understanding 
of this change in state property policies. We also call attention to the risks of a reversal of the pri-
vatisation logic. An increasing role of the state as proprietor may today strengthen similar negative 
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1. INTRODUCTION
An important school of the comparative research on the economic development 
of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries evolved within the broader 
framework of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, with the most fre-
quently cited contribution by Hall – Soskice (2001).1 Among the many ensuing 
contributions we find analytical ones that compare various quantitative measures 
of the systemic features of capital and labour markets, education, social security, 
and innovation systems. CEE countries were repeatedly tested whether they fitted 
in one or another existing model, or whether they should be rather treated as a 
separate model. Research results were rather mixed.2 Another string of literature 
used the political economy approach and concentrated on the interplays between 
polity and economy during the transition process. Authors of this approach (King 
2007; Bohle – Greskovits 2007; Blanke – Hofmann 2008; Schoenman 2014) 
state that the establishment of political and market economic institutions and the 
redistribution of political and economic power went hand in hand. Therefore, 
the concrete layout of the systemic elements of the market economies largely 
depended on social and political developments in the transition process. Some 
authors emphasised different features of the transition economies and tried to 
work out various models for CEE (Bohle – Greskovits 2007; Lane 2007; EC 
2008; Rodrigues 2009). Others concentrated on strong similarities and argued 
that there was little difference among CEE countries, but rather a significant gap 
between countries in Central Europe and the post-soviet countries (Lane 2007; 
Csaba 2007; Szanyi 2012). The main drawback of the approaches concerning 
the CEE economies is that they do not provide a positive description of the CEE 
model.
Nölke – Vliegenhart (2009) wrote an important paper in which they tried to 
conceptualise the CEE economic model. They picked out the role of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) in shaping the structure of the emerging market economies of 
the Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). They 
argued that the high share of multinational companies in the production and trade 
of these economies strongly influenced the development of certain other eco-
nomic and social sub-systems as well. Their impact on national innovation and 
education systems was negative because their operation did not need high-end 
inputs from these systems. Furthermore, strong bias was exercised on a variety 
1  They distinguished between two main models, the Anglo-Saxon and the continental model.
2  For an excellent overview of the relevant literature, see Farkas (2011). Her paper also contains 
a rather comprehensive econometric analysis of quantitative variables of the above-mentioned 
features.
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of national policies since multinational companies’ tax reliefs deprived govern-
ments of financial tools, and also because their operation was largely independent 
of national policies. Nölke – Vliegenhart called their CEE model the dependent 
market economy model (DME). The DME model was criticised for the limited 
scope of analysis, for the lack of a comprehensive approach of the determinants 
shaping national systems (Szanyi 2012). Nevertheless, the DME model was the 
first contribution that elaborated one major systemic element of the CEE eco-
nomic model.
In an earlier paper (Szanyi 2012), I listed a number of factors that shaped 
institutions and influenced economic performance of CEE in addition to FDI. 
The most important of these was the state. In the present paper, I would like to 
contribute to the DME model with the analysis of one important aspect of state 
policies: direct economic intervention through publicly held enterprises. The im-
portance of the issue has been highlighted recently through various statist govern-
ment measures mainly in Hungary, but also in some other CEE countries. They 
have been aimed at changing the FDI-dominated status quo and increasing state 
influence. The most striking among these steps were aimed at a revival of direct 
state economic intervention through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were 
never privatised. 
The Hungarian government, for example, repeatedly declared its intention 
to increase national ownership in so-called “strategic” sectors like banking, re-
tail trade, media, utility service providers, and certain manufacturing branches. 
Through the nationalisation of the assets of private pension funds, it acquired a 
minority share ownership in a large number of companies. This ownership share 
has been further increased in some firms (e.g. Rába, MOL) through additional 
share purchases. The state also acquired various banks and utility companies 
(electricity, water, and gas). In Poland, through the more sluggish privatisation 
process, substantial state ownership remained and privatisation was significantly 
decelerated after 2011 (Baltowski – Kozarzewski 2015). Moreover, the Polish 
government also nationalised at least partially the assets of private pension funds 
(Financial Times 2014). But the state spared ownership positions in several hun-
dreds of Czech companies as well and there is no sign of further privatisation 
ambitions in that country either.
State and public ownership is not unknown in any established market econo-
my. Corrections for many types of market failures can be most easily achieved 
by the public provision of certain services. Also, one of the main instruments 
of the developmental state are the SOEs. If we look at the ownership structure 
of coordinated market economies such as Austria or Germany, or mixed mar-
ket economies (France and Italy), we find a large number of SOEs in each of 
these countries. Although the de-nationalisation of the state-owned sector was on 
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the agenda in several countries in Europe (UK and France) and in the Americas 
(Mexico and Chile) especially during the 1980s, these privatisation deals rather 
concerned individual companies and not complete economies. Unlike in transi-
tion economies, they were not part of a systemic change. 
Privatisation in transition economies on the other hand was always regarded as 
a key element of the transition process. The usual tasks and properties of SOEs 
were overshadowed by the political and institutional goals of transition policies. 
They were determined by the neoliberal mainstream ideology, which was trans-
mitted by the international financial institutions and development agencies. Pri-
vatisation was regarded as a tool for increasing the popularity of the transition 
process too (Appel 2004), either by the usage of give-away type privatisation 
methods, and/or by ideological and political (anti-communist, nationalist) argu-
mentation. In Hungary, the economic reform traditions provided a very fertile soil 
for pro-market arguments. In Poland, the privatisation process was based on stake-
holder consensus rooted in the strong self-management desire of the Solidarity 
movement. Variations between the privatisation policies in CEE were reflected in 
the well-known gradualism vs. shock therapy debate,3 which was mostly about 
the social acceptance of transition measures and the potential threat of reversal by 
opposing “nomenclature” and incumbent communist political forces.
The strong political charge of privatisation and the equally strong neoliber-
al influence on the transition process resulted in a high emphasis on the speed 
and depth of privatisation in CEE, regardless of the actual technical solutions 
(voucher scheme, insider buyout, or sales method). Not surprisingly, according to 
the EBRD transition reports, over two-thirds of GDP production in all CEE coun-
tries was private by the end of the 1990s, regardless of the substantial differences 
in privatisation policies (Schoenman 2014). Similarities continued also later on, 
for example after 2000, when disappointment in the results of the transition proc-
ess swept over the CEE transition economies. Privatisation was then a major area 
of debate, the general public opinion regarded it as organised theft (Appel 2004). 
More serious, albeit not quite nuanced critics also characterised the transition 
process of the 1990s as a period when free market ideology had been aggressively 
pushed onto post-communist governments (Stiglitz 1999). Appel (2004) argued 
that the role of ideology in post-communist economic policy-making was much 
more nuanced than what is reflected in earlier debates and later criticisms. She 
called for the considerations of the individual and group interest of agents, “the 
beliefs and preferences of actors on the ground deserve much more recognition 
than Stiglitz allows for” (p. 6). Thus, while the overall attitude towards transition 
3  For a good summary, see, among others, Roland (2000).
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policies had a heavy ideological charge, the actual implementation of policies 
was always influenced by local personal and group interest.4
Based on Kopecky (2006), Schoenman (2014) stated that political parties in 
CEE had weak ideological underpinnings and voters revolved among parties fre-
quently. Ideological values were hardly transferred to the general public. In the 
early phase of transition, the ideological values of the “international adviser com-
munity” were transferred in cooperation with local political leaders and officials. 
Their role was to ensure public support from various groups of society. In doing 
so, they could use ideological argumentation to bring legitimacy for political de-
cisions. But more frequently, they used either coercive mechanisms (the threat 
or actual use of force) or remunerative measures (economic incentives). Naczyk 
(2014) interpreted the most current (ideological) changes in Polish and Hungar-
ian economic policy as simple shifts in the content of “economic patriotism”. 
He argued that during the 1990s, the most important national goal was a quick 
departure from communism and from central planning, which was backed most 
efficiently by the neoliberal idea. During the late 2000s, when the earlier goals 
were effectively achieved, a new content was given to economic patriotism: the 
strengthening of national business presence and a halt on the further internation-
alisation of CEE economies. Both the Hungarian and the Polish transition history 
provided many examples of similar changes in policy preferences.5  
An important message can be drawn from the above discussion, which will 
be used in the argumentation of this paper. The relationship of politicians and 
political parties of CEE to economic issues is less ideological than in the case 
of more established market economies, but rather pragmatic. The actual imple-
mentation of economic policies is determined by several factors. First, there is an 
ideologically underpinned “mainstream” influence of the international adviser 
community (which found general support during the 1990s, but was rejected in 
many cases after the 2008/2009 crisis). Second, the implementation of policies 
4  Mihályi – Sztankó (2015) cited the case of the privatisation attempts of the Hungarian electric-
ity company, which was effectively opposed by the incumbent management, regardless of the 
ideological orientation (liberal, nationalist) of various succeeding governments. In Poland, the 
role of the Solidarity movement could never be neglected and this led to a slower, but social 
consensus-based privatisation policy. 
5  Among others, Naczyk (2014) mentioned Krzysztof Bielecki, who was Prime Minister in 
1991 during the Polish shock therapy who later, in 2014, called himself a “pragmatic liberal” 
and as member of the Council of Economic Advisers to the Tusk government, supported the 
promotion of national champions and other steps reflecting increased economic patriotism in 
Poland. In the case of Hungary, the political career of Viktor Orbán, the current Prime Minis-
ter, and his party reflects a similar flexibility in ideological underpinnings, ranging from liberal 
ideas during the first half of the 1990s to economic patriotism and a vision of the illiberal state 
in Hungary most recently. 
38 M. SZANYI
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
was always strongly influenced by domestic pressure groups, including business 
groups (local and also international) or even individual entrepreneurs as well as 
by social organisations such as trade unions, but less by civil society to various 
degrees in the CEE countries. Last, but not least, policies were influenced by the 
self-interest of political parties or even their strong leaders.
I will argue in this paper that changes, even U-turns in economic policies, were 
increasingly initiated by this later factor (polity) after the 2008 crisis because 
the first two factors lost much of their influence. The international adviser com-
munity lost its influence because the underlying mainstream economic thoughts 
were largely discredited by the crisis. Unions and other social groups were also 
subdued by the hardships of the crisis and had to comply with government poli-
cies. Last, but not least, controls weakened in the new member states of the EU 
largely because the main attention was driven away from the new members to the 
euro crisis and the Mediterranean economies. In such cases, when the legitimacy 
of governments does not come from ideologically underpinned, tested principles 
(as was demonstrated previously), policies may fall victim to individual or group 
(party) interests.6 One of the main messages of the current paper is that this type 
of “pragmatic” economic policy seriously undermines market economic institu-
tions because of its arbitrary nature. The lack or weakening of normative policy 
measures threatens the rule of law.  
2. PRIVATISATION AND STATE ASSET MANAGEMENT 
IN CEE TRANSITION POLICY MIX
The role of state ownership in established market economies is described mainly 
as a policy tool to correct market failures, and the debate is mainly over the op-
timal size and efficiency of the state sector. In the case of transition economies, 
state property is usually regarded as part of the economic system of the previous 
political regime that should be reduced in order to give way to the institutions 
and players of the establishing new market economic system. Therefore, state 
ownership is regarded in a complex manner, including not only business con-
siderations or the usual aspects of overcoming market failures, but also general 
aspects of systemic change. As Frydman – Rapaczinsky (1994) stated a long time 
6  Of course, party and individual interests always play a role in modern societies. As Drahok-
oupil (2008) noted, the Central European transition economies of the 1990s were characterised 
by the emergence of a new political elite, the “comprador service sector”, that effectively 
supported and complemented the spread of multinational businesses in the region. Thus, the 
economic regime of neoliberal economic thought also served certain individual and party in-
terests.    
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ago, privatisation was an outstanding issue from a political point of view, since it 
could contribute to the elimination of the economic power of the elite of the pre-
vious political regime. This impact on the systemic change together with the then 
overwhelming neoliberal theory put considerable pressure on policymakers to 
privatise as much and as quickly as possible. The campaign-like expectations of 
the international institutions was repeatedly articulated and expressed in strong 
messages such as the Transition Index of the EBRD, already mentioned above. 
Privatisation was treated not only as being politically important, but also as 
a tool of economic restructuring. In this sense, two main aspects gained impor-
tance. One was the improvement of corporate performance (the inherited state-
owned companies suffered from a variety of serious weaknesses). The impor-
tance of privatisation in strengthening corporate performance was highlighted 
in the literature mainly by scholars of the gradualist approach (Kornai, Roland, 
Portes, Aghion, and others). The other aspect was the general support of institu-
tion building, which included the strengthening of capital markets and enabling 
various social strata to become the new owners of productive property. The desire 
to improve performance dominated the Hungarian privatisation process, while 
capital market development and the maintenance of social consensus prevailed in 
Poland, and the creation of a bright social strata of a new bourgeoisie was the aim 
of the Czech voucher privatisation scheme. The fierce activity of various interest 
groups could be observed in the background of the various privatisation policies. 
They all wanted to shape the details of the general policy aims in ways prefer-
ential for them. In Hungary, for example, spontaneous privatisation started even 
before the political change. Self-appointed new owners from the incumbent man-
agement of state firms successfully stripped state assets to create private compa-
nies. Later, in the real privatisation process, the implementation of various tools 
depended very much on the cooperation of incumbent managers. The so-called 
“indirect privatisation scheme” of medium-sized companies required managers to 
initiate and complete the privatisation of “their” companies – the state privatisa-
tion agency only controlled and approved. Also, the specific bankruptcy regula-
tions in Hungary gave way to insider tricks to obtain state property (Szanyi 2000). 
The various channels of transforming state property into insider-controlled pri-
vate ownership created important but internationally not really strong local own-
ers. The new Hungarian owners suffered a number of weaknesses that made local 
ownership inferior to multinational firms concerning company performance.
Arguments for strengthening corporate performance exceeded the general-
ly used rather simplistic neoliberal statements about the superiority of private 
owner ship. Boycko et al. (1996) argued that private ownership increased the cost 
of enforcing political considerations over the business rationale, privatisation 
therefore contributed to the reduction of political influence in exchange for more 
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efficient company functioning. State-owned firms could be more easily influ-
enced to care for politically motivated goals such as excessive employment than 
private firms. Another string of literature highlighted the important impact of pri-
vate property in reducing governments’ toolkit in taking arbitrary economic pol-
icy steps that could deteriorate the efficiency of market institutions. Rapaczynski 
(1996: 93) also stated that from the viewpoint of property right enforcement, the 
biggest danger might come from excessive state ownership. The state can refrain 
from excessive takings and the increase of state ownership for a longer period of 
time. This track record would convince market players that the state respects pri-
vate property. An excessive and continuous increase in state property (especially 
if this is carried out by direct or indirect takings) indicates that the state does not 
respect private property and increases the room for (often arbitrary) increased 
direct state intervention.  
The complex role of privatisation in the transition process increased the im-
pact of the methods and also determined the outcomes on the current economic 
development of countries in East Central Europe. The two and a half decades of 
ownership changes contributed to the establishment of an overall business and 
investment climate and typical government policy practice. In Hungary, for ex-
ample, there were two influential systemic components: foreign company owner-
ship, integration into multinational value chains, and the crony capitalism of lo-
cal politicians and capital owners. The two drivers were not separated, but they 
established the two poles of a dual economy. The Hungarian governments often 
pursued policies to favour one or the other pole. The activity of foreign compa-
nies was usually influenced by indirect legal measures (taxes, license conditions 
and the like), which often contradicted the principle of equal treatment favouring 
or punishing them. Local business was more often helped informally, giving way 
to the emergence of crony capitalism.
In my understanding, crony capitalism means a legally unregulated (badly 
regulated ) interaction between polity and business that works against the princi-
ples of free enterprising and fair competition. Policymakers and influential busi-
ness people cooperate to create preferential treatment for “friendly business” in 
exchange for the material support of parties, politicians, and election campaigns. 
This type of cooperation is not unknown in developed economies, though a more 
developed institutional background and strong civil society control may limit the 
harmful impacts of cronyism on market economic institutions. If the financial 
support of political parties is transparent and lobbying for industry (company) 
interests is institutionalised, then crony capitalism is under social control. It does 
not mean, of course, that the markets are free of marginal interest enforcement. 
If cronyism is not transparent, it may lead to very high social losses and even 
illegal transactions. A major difference between most of the established market 
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economies and most of the transition economies lies in the level of institutional 
and social control of polity-business interactions. Loose control in transition 
economies deteriorates investment and business climate, which is expressed in 
the rather low level of rankings in competitiveness reports and the high cost of 
financing.   
Interaction between polity and business has been surveyed in the CEE region 
by many scholars. Well known contributions by Stark (1996), Stark – Bruszt 
(1998), and McDermott (2002) highlighted that the creation of ownership struc-
ture in CEE was marred by cronyism and favouritism, and established new clans/
interest groups. The clans incorporated representatives of the political sphere as 
well. Papers of the 1990s expressed fears of the re-establishment of the economic 
power of the “nomenclature”. This argument is known also from the papers of 
the mainstream literature (as it was cited earlier from Boycko et al. 1996). Nev-
ertheless, as time passed by, the fears of a political return to the pre-transition 
communist rule proved to be impossible. However, instead of a political retreat 
to communism, increasing cronyism posed new threats to the development and 
efficiency of market economic institutions. 
A new contribution to the just mentioned string of literature on the role of 
networks and clans is Schoenman (2014). This book differentiated among CEE 
economies according to the type and strength of polity–business interactions. The 
intensity and main values of the relationship were determined by the level of 
uncertainty in polity and of doing business (political changes, regulatory envi-
ronment, macroeconomic policies, etc.), and the structure of business networks. 
Broad networks link cross-sectoral coalitions and facilitate collective action. The 
role of networks is especially strong in societies with weak institutions. Instead 
of institutions, networks may become the more important channels of interest 
representation. Business networks tend to develop political ties in cases when 
there is political competition and politicians and parties need (financial) support, 
and there are mutual benefits in the relationship. The process is accelerated in 
the presence of political and economic uncertainty. Based on Kitschelt (2000), 
he also states that in the case of strong business networks, institutions more likely 
become “broadly distributive”, providing for a wider layer of business norma-
tively (i.e. independent from agents’ political sympathy and support). In contrast, 
“selective advantage” institutions distribute benefits to targeted recipients who 
are among the supporters of the ruling political party.     
Under a high level of uncertainty, collective action evolves in the presence of 
broad networks. This is because of an efficient information flow that increases 
the threat to reputation in the case of selective agreements. Under high levels 
of uncertainty and narrow networks, cooperation between business and polity is 
unlikely because the value of political promises is low due to the lack of business 
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support, and does not spread due to inefficient information flows. Consequently, 
business turns directly to the state and not in a concerted manner. In the case of 
a low level of uncertainty and narrow business networks, polity is not afraid of 
political competition and can exploit atomised firms. Under low levels of uncer-
tainty and broad networks, the state is likely to enter into collusive relations with 
firms. The four types of relationship are summarised as follows:
Table 1. The effect of networks and uncertainty on the state
Uncertainty
Low High
Network structure
Narrow Patronage Captured
Broad Embedded corporatist Concertation
Source: Schoenman (2014: 50).
Different consequences result from the distinct settings concerning polity 
(state)–business relationships. In a high uncertainty environment, broad business 
networks tend to establish regular cooperation links with polity and the state that 
work in favour of the broad business community. In exchange it provides the nec-
essary financial stability to political parties. The state develops mutually benefi-
cial institutions for concentration in the long run. The state broadly functions as 
a coordinating agent, channels information, and mediates among interests. When 
networks are narrow (business elites do not create cooperation) and uncertainty is 
low with a stable, monolithic political structure and solid economic environment, 
the state applies “selective advantage”-type institutional solutions and picks the 
winners. This setting is called patronage. In the case of high uncertainty and 
narrow business networks, economic elites dominate political elites, potentially 
leading to state capture. Finally, low uncertainty and broad networks describe the 
Table 2. Networks, uncertainty, and state types
Uncertainty
Low High
Network structure Narrow
Patronage states: 
Czech Rep., Latvia, 
Estonia, Slovak Rep., 
Slovenia, Romania
Captured states: 
Albania, Bulgaria
Broad Embedded corporatist Concertation states: Hungary, Lithuania, Poland
Source: Schoenman (2014: 174).
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embedded corporatist state. In this case, well established political elites do not 
face uncertainty and cooperate with business networks. In Schoenman’s opinion 
this setting is unlikely to happen in competitive election systems. 
Schoenman (2014) presents a factor analysis using various proxy measures of 
uncertainty and network density for CEE economies. While the indicators and also 
the actual relevance of the results may be discussed, the typology is remarkable 
(Table 2). Patronage and captured states corroborate with the concept of state and 
business capture (Yakovlev 2006). The typology can also be used in the explana-
tion of recent changes of polity–business relationships in Poland and Hungary. 
3. THE IMPRINT OF INCREASING ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM 
IN CHANGING OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
In Hungary, the left-wing Bajnai government declared the privatisation proc-
ess completed in 2008 (Hungarian Government 2009). This meant that there re-
mained a substantial effective state ownership. The statement itself could be also 
understood as a statement that potentially allowed nationalisation. And indeed, 
this happened sporadically until 2010 and on a larger scale since then under the 
right-wing governments. In terms of asset volume, re-nationalised property after 
2010 was smaller by one order of magnitude than privatised assets after 1990 
(Mihályi 2015). Nevertheless, the turn in attitude towards state ownership has 
far-reaching impacts. The importance of the relationship has not declined since 
the 1990s when it was a most topical issue. Rapaczynski (1996) explains the 
complex role of the state in enforcing property rights, including the need for oc-
casional nationalisations.7 The state routinely engages in economic regulation, 
which in some cases results in encroachments that are not considered compensa-
ble takings. General protection from an excessive spread of such takings can be 
provided by the political system together with economic pressure groups “that 
ensure that the state does not go ‘too far’ in interfering with the owner’s control 
over assets. This politically determined thin line may be understood as the real 
definition of property rights conferred by the state … In fact, without a significant 
historical record of state forbearance from excessive and redistributive regula-
tion, it is hard to make the state’s commitment credible. The threat posed by 
the state to the security of broadly defined property rights is particularly severe 
7  There have been occasional re-nationalisations in the 1990–2010 period as well, which were 
usually followed by quick re-privatisations. The Hungarian state did not intend to increase 
the volume of state assets in this period and the role of nationalisations remained marginal in 
this period. 
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when the state also happens to own a significant proportion of national assets” 
(Rapaczynski 1996: 93). This danger threatens any government regardless of po-
litical affiliation.
Voszka (2013) and Mihályi (2015) compiled a comprehensive list of re-na-
tionalisations in Hungary after 2010. Using this information, we would like to 
describe the main and typical reasons for these transactions and their potential 
beneficiaries and possible political aims. Each transaction was explained in some 
kind of government communication. The explanations shed light on potential 
general concepts of state property management policies which have not been de-
scribed conceptually until now. It seems that various, sometimes only loosely 
connected reasons and considerations worked behind the most important takings. 
They fit together only at a very high abstraction level of the general (rather popu-
list) attitudes of the government towards economic clients, multinational firms, 
the expected business–government relationships, and the overall desire for ad-
hoc arbitrary decisions instead of normative accountable regulation. Instead of a 
general policy concept, we can rely mainly on the statements of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán and Minister of the Economy (later President of the Hungarian cen-
tral bank, MNB, György Matolcsy). The Prime Minister, for example, repeatedly 
stated that the new economic policy required that at least 50% of the Hungarian 
banking sector should be in national (not necessarily state) ownership, and that 
public utility firms must work on a non-profit basis. The repeated anti-globalisa-
tion attacks targeted mainly the largest multinational companies in various serv-
ices industries. The reduction of dependence from the globalised world economy, 
for example, required that financial institutions be in national hands (if public, 
the better). Achieving the desired level of state assets was made possible through 
various transactions.
Taking the list of re-nationalisations (Mihályi 2015: 17), the overall picture 
shows that between 2010 and 2014, 209 companies were affected and the total 
value of the transactions was slightly over HUF 1,573 bn (cca. EUR 5 bn). This 
amount included the sales price paid to previous owners, the increase of share 
capital, and other commitments as well. The numbers and amounts seem to be 
very high, especially if we consider that Hungarian governments accumulated 
public debt in excess of the Maastricht criteria already prior to the 2008–2009 cri-
sis. However, as Mihályi (2015) explains, these transactions did not increase state 
gross debt since they represented a simple change in the asset structure, a kind of 
securities swap of more liquid assets. Yet, if we look at the list of transactions, we 
find that the overwhelming majority of the financial commitments stemmed from 
transactions in the energy and banking sectors (HUF 1,366 bn). Also, the number 
of the affected companies was boosted by a large number of small savings banks 
(137 financial institutions altogether).
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Various political aims can be detected among the different reasons of re-na-
tionalisation. The first outstanding transaction was the nationalisation of the sec-
ond pillar of the pension system at the turn of 2010/2011. The official explanation 
called for the security of the accumulated pension funds to be taken out of the 
hands of the private pension funds, which failed to bring the expected returns 
(“played with hazardous securities”). Account holders of private pension funds 
were called to withdraw and channel their savings into the state pension system at 
the risk of losing their pension rights in the pay-as-you-go state pension system. 
The government applied the “opting out” trick, meaning that those who wanted 
to keep their pensions untouched had to face the threat and, additionally, they 
were required to go through a complicated administrative procedure. Those who 
accepted the government policies did not have to move their fingers at all. Thus, 
in the end, 2.8 million account holders channelled back their savings into the state 
pension system at a value of approximately HUF 3,000 bn (EUR 10 bn), equiva-
lent to 10% of GDP. Most observers believe that the “voluntary” nationalisation 
of the private pension funds was aimed at using the obtained assets for debt relief 
(which, on the other hand, was accumulated partly by the social security system). 
Despite the propaganda campaign, the blackmailing of the citizens was received 
as a major shock. Nevertheless, the transaction brought large amount of govern-
ment bonds back to the state budget, together with a substantial and diversified 
portfolio of corporate shares and bonds. Thus, this campaign was the first major, 
albeit unintended step of increasing state ownership in a fair number of commer-
cial companies.  
A larger number of transactions and regulatory changes over a longer period 
of time were undertaken under the umbrella of cutting utility costs. The prom-
ise of savings on utility costs was a major campaign tool of the 2010 and 2014 
election campaigns. The government soon prohibited the price increases of the 
public utilities. Later on, prices were set by government agencies at significantly 
lower levels than before, thus eliminating profits from this sector. This was the 
first measure that directly affected the profitability of private business. Later, 
new taxes were introduced, among others, on financial transactions, mobile tel-
ephone calls, ATM cash withdrawals, and advertisement revenues of the media 
(over a certain threshold8). Limiting utility costs through price decrease resulted 
in companies going into the red. Owners soon felt encouraged to sell their loss-
making firms. This process can be called regulatory taking: company revenues 
8  The advertisement tax was targeted against the German media group RTL with the largest 
revenues. Government communication explained the measure with the company’s suspected 
tax evasion. Yet, it was never explained why, if there was something illegal in RTL’s taxation, 
this had not been repaired by the responsible state institution, the tax office.  
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dry up because of unfavourable changes in market regulations or excessive taxes. 
Many of the utility firms were thus sold to central or local public bodies. Some of 
them received quite generous compensations (for example German RWE). The 
purchase of utility firms can be explained by the government’s utility cost reduc-
tion policy.9
The re-nationalised utility firms were in foreign ownership, and the regula-
tory takings against them heralded a third important consideration that seems 
to have some explanatory power: the unfriendly relationship to selected foreign 
companies. The Hungarian governments repeatedly enacted market regulations 
and changed the tax system to bite the cash revenues of large multinational firms 
and create more favourable conditions for domestic capital owners. Neverthe-
less, this policy targeted certain types of companies: financial institutions, media 
firms, large retail chains, and telecom companies. Their negative treatment was 
explained in governmental communication with the argument that they do not 
contribute to the material (real economic) production platform of the Hungarian 
economy. This kind of populist confrontation of the various economic branches 
has not been put forward since the beginning of the transition process.10 
In 2013, the method of regulatory capture (Yakovlev 2006) was applied in the 
case of the cooperative of local deposit collecting financial institutions. First, the 
state increased the level of required funding capital. Since small banks could not 
meet the new obligation overnight, the state itself provided them with the nec-
essary capital and connected this transaction to the acquisition of a controlling 
share of ownership. Owners of the small banks were not asked beforehand, but 
were given an ultimatum in case they would reject the generous offer. In 2014, 
the Hungarian state acquired MKB Bank from the German owners. The German 
parent bank was unwilling to run the Hungarian daughter at a loss and sold it to 
the only serious buyer: the Hungarian state. The losses, however, were caused by 
various negative changes in the business environment initiated by the Hungarian 
government (extra tax on banks’ profits, tax on financial transactions), and the 
 9  It is, of course, another question whether the current sales revenues are sufficiently high for the 
necessary investments. Observers state that public utility companies are still in extremely bad 
financial conditions and do not invest any more, which may even threaten the quality of their 
services.
10  To my knowledge, the last major Hungarian policy campaign to be explained by similar vulgar 
Marxist arguments was the reconstruction program of the Hungarian textile industry at the 
turn of the 1980s. The industry’s obsolete technology was replaced by more modern equip-
ment from borrowed money. At the same time, the services infrastructure remained very much 
underdeveloped. For example, obtaining a new subscription wired telephone line required 
several years and was in many cases only possible if another subscriber died or gave up his/her 
subscription. Ironically, after the systemic change, the then new capacities of the Hungarian 
textile industry were soon scrapped, and the development of the telecom market skyrocketed. 
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losses due to the government-initiated debt relief program offered for the accom-
modation of increased debt burdens on foreign currency denominated loans of 
Hungarian citizens. The achievement of a 50% national ownership presence in 
the banking sector was heralded soon after. Later that year, a 25% stake in FHB 
Bank was purchased by the Hungarian Post, increasing national ownership to 
over 60% of bank assets. 
A further important consideration behind the re-nationalisations is supporting 
clients or personal rent-seeking. This can take place if market regulations change 
in favour of the domestic market players. Another possibility is selling (privatis-
ing) acquired assets to clients. In some cases, the clients’ loss-making companies 
were bailed out by the state through generous acquisitions of assets. The most 
striking example of this type of transaction was the redistribution of tobacco sales 
licenses. Tobacco sales were limited to specialist shops (normal retail stores were 
deprived of the right to sell tobacco products), and the new sales concessionary 
licenses were tendered by local authorities. In several cases, evidence was found 
that the tenders were not competitive. The political importance of supporting loy-
al domestic business people was emphasised several times by the Prime Minister 
(Mihályi 2015: 19). However, not only loyal capital owners are supported, but 
also a wider range of state and party officials who need positions and revenues 
from the company boards. This is the simplest way of rewarding clients. The right 
to appoint loyal persons into positions is not necessarily bound to dominant state 
ownership, but definitely makes it easier. Rewarding clients is perhaps the most 
commonly used additional, secondary (rent-seeking) aim of takings.       
In the case of Poland, state property management practice has not yet been 
reversed. At the beginning, privatisation in Poland was slower, mainly due to the 
continuous search for social consensus and the necessary approval of stakehold-
ers in every case. After the rather sluggish practice of the 1990s, 1999 and 2000 
witnessed a skyrocketing privatisation activity in Poland. This was due to the 
then favoured direct sale method and the denationalisation of some large banks 
and service providers. However, this momentum stopped in 2001 when the previ-
ous sluggish insider-oriented methods continued. A new revival of privatisation 
sales began when the Tusk government came into power. After the necessary 
preparations, privatisation revenues started to grow in 2009, peaking in 2010 
with over US$ 6 bn and producing half of that level in 2011. The net privatisation 
income of the Tusk government between 2008 and 2012 reached US$ 15.5 bn 
(WSJ 2012). The same source already heralded the change in concept: large firms 
were regarded “strategic” and not to be privatised. This meant that the new, still 
rather ambitious privatisation program for the years 2012–2013 was not enforced 
with the momentum of the previous years. A curious halt in selling the control-
ling shares of some “flagship companies”, mainly in the financial sector, was ob-
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served by The Economist (2011) already in the otherwise successful privatisation 
campaign of 2008–2011. The Polish government seemed to pull the emergency 
brake on the privatisation train. This practice of maintaining state assets is quite 
similar to the conceptual changes of state asset policies in Hungary. 
Instead of the systemic, fiscal aspects gained importance in the state property 
policy of the Polish government after 2011. While only minority shares were sold 
that in most cases did not eliminate effective state control, the fiscal revenues of 
the central budget were increased by dividend payments from state-owned com-
panies (Kozarzewski 2015; Blaszczyk – Patena 2015). The growing importance 
of budget revenues of profits from running SOEs demonstrates an important de-
parture from the systemic aspects of privatisation and state property management 
in Poland. Naczyk (2014) analysed a series of steps taken by the Polish govern-
ments towards strengthening state control over firms with mixed ownership. The 
governance structures of these firms were transformed and “poison pills” were 
incorporated that gave the state extra veto rights even in the case of minority state 
ownership. This meant that the Polish government too dedicated long-term em-
phasis on maintaining and using SOEs for various policy purposes.     
4. FURTHER REASONS FOR REVERSING THE PRIVATISATION LOGIC
Boycko et al. (1996) calls excessive employment the most typical political am-
bition that is forced on companies, thus deteriorating their efficiency. But other 
forms of political opportunism and rent-seeking are also plausible. They mention 
an article that described the perverse crediting policy of the state-owned Credit 
Lyonnais bank of France that favoured clients of the ruling party. Although the 
case was mentioned as an exception, I believe that in CEE, this type of rent-seek-
ing has always been more important than employment issues for vote collection. 
When I speak about the reversal of the privatisation logic, I mean that steps were 
taken in CEE countries that targeted political and personal interest rather than the 
social interest concerning state property policies. Privatisation and the dominance 
of private property were regarded as safeguards against this type of rent-seeking. 
The increase of the economic role of the state sector can be regarded as deliberate 
actions to create more potential for abuses.  
I distinguish various types of actual cash transfers from the economy to poli-
ticians and their clients. One of them is outright corruption and bribing (moral 
hazard ). In our case, bribes go from the business to the politician and the bu-
reaucrats to buy preferential treatment or simply a license of operation. The cor-
rupt politician and the bureaucrat may expand this activity to the extremes as it 
was conceptualised by Yakovlev (2006) with the notion of business capture, and 
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Viktorov (2013) on corporate raiding. CEE’s conditions are of course by far not 
as bad as in Russia, but corruption also exists in CEE. High-level scandals that 
involved government officials and other highly-ranked party politicians or their 
clients revealed that countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, or the Czech 
Republic are not immune to this danger either (EU transfers to Bulgaria and Ro-
mania were effectively suspended due to high-level corruption).
Corruption, especially by highly-ranked officials, is sanctioned by law. But 
there are other, not necessarily illegal, albeit seriously unethical opportunities of 
money transfers from the business to the polity. State ownership is most relevant 
in these. Positions at the commanding heights of SOEs are regularly filled by 
clients of politicians.11 This practice eliminates the conflicts between the man-
agement and politician. But this also provides an opportunity for milking the 
SOE through various channels. A SOE is useful for this purpose regardless of its 
potential efficiency. The social cost of this practice is no longer simply foregone 
profits, but continuous cash flow from various state institutions (the state budget) 
that are transferred from the SOE to private uses. SOEs may finance various 
social and cultural events, deliver red carpet treatment to politicians, and donate 
to charity organisations or various activities of the government and politicians. 
SOEs are also used for rewarding politicians’ clients, for example by financing 
expert fees.
Of course, the use of SOEs for these purposes is not new and is observed not 
just in transition economies of CEE. However, this fact does not spare me the 
conclusion that current policies at maintaining state ownership are aimed at wid-
ening the rent-seeking activity of political parties and governments. It is made 
possible exactly because of the low level of transparency and social control, and 
the activity causes the same types of problems that were described in the pri-
vatisation papers of the 1990s, and it is therefore very harmful for the future of 
market institutions in CEE. The reasons of intensive rent-seeking in CEE are 
manifold. Apart from personal gain, we can point to the lack of regulated party 
financing. Political parties’ budgets are very meagre, and parties spend far more, 
especially on election campaigns, than what they are expected.  
There might be some changes in the practice of milking state assets during 
the 25 years of transition in CEE. Initially, the main source of cash revenues was 
privatisation. It is not just corruption that surrounded the process, but even more 
importantly, the support of clients to obtain valuable state assets at low prices. 
The process was well documented in the case of Russia, and some anecdotal 
evidence is also known for Slovakia. However, this practice was not absent in 
11  Skuhrovec (2014) reported peaks of personnel changes in Czech SOEs’ supervision bodies 
after national election years. 
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other Visegrad countries either. In some recent Hungarian cases, a potential re-
distribution of assets re-emerged, the government declared itself to be ready to 
re-privatise some firms, although there is no evidence whether this has happened. 
Nevertheless, opportunities of privatisation are quite rare today in Hungary. In 
the case of Poland, rent-seeking during the privatisation process was perhaps less 
widespread due to the more transparent privatisation transactions.
Today, one reason for less privatisation and more state ownership may be the 
changing structure of rent-seeking activity by the politicians. Of course, the de-
cline of available state assets also contributed to this: the remaining assets are 
either notorious loss-making companies (like mines in Poland) that are not worth 
possessing for insiders, or they are large service providers that cannot be easily 
transferred to rent-seeking private hands. But SOEs in their present forms are 
all quite suitable for mass-scale milking. Another reason for keeping state as-
sets may be the changing domestic and international environment. International 
organisations are no longer concerned as much about privatisation as they were 
during the 1990s. Therefore, international pressure for privatisation declined. 
In 2004, the Visegrad countries became members of the EU. Attention was 
directed rather to fiscal deficits rather than to the conditions of market institu-
tions or the level of state ownership. Of course, the status of the state budget is 
also influenced by the performance of SOEs as well as their state subsidies, but 
this is already an indirect link which can be easily covered. Also, the important 
business rationale of privatisation declined in the meantime. The overall condi-
tion of all transition economies improved (maybe not because of improving SOE 
performance, but mainly due to the increased activity of multinational companies 
and de novo private firms), and thus the presence of a number of loss-making 
SOEs could be more easily tolerated. Consequently, the third, political rationale, 
the redistribution of assets or, more recently, the control of cash flows became the 
strongest factor in the question of keeping or selling state property.      
The reversal of the privatisation logic imposes the danger of an increased ob-
scurity and arbitrariness of economic policy as well, which can lead to an overall 
decline of the effect of market institutions against politically determined influ-
ences. This may be expressed in the growing impact of “selective advantage” 
measures against “broadly distributive” institutions, or, using the categories of 
Schoenman (2014), a shift from concerted relationship and effective institutions 
towards a patronage state and less effective market institutions. Some govern-
ment declarations expressed a deliberate shift in Hungary, explaining the failure 
of the markets and calling for more government intervention. This increased gov-
ernment intervention seems to push the polity–business relationship towards the 
patronage state, and weakens already established market institutions. 
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Changes in state property management were complemented by a series of other 
steps of state favouritism in Hungary, ranging from public procurement to market 
regulation. Many of these steps seriously contradicted normative regulation and 
violated the principle of equal treatment and EU competition law. For example, 
only in the first half of 2015, three major procedures were launched in Brussels 
against the Hungarian government. The levy on retail trade supervision and tax 
on tobacco products were suspended, and grants for road construction to Hungary 
were suspended due to the ongoing competition policy procedures. In the first 
two cases, tax policy measures were designed in such a way as to favour a se-
lected number of politically linked players. The public procurement cases were 
investigated because of unusually high prices, but road construction was regarded 
by observers also as one of the main areas of patronage.12
Selective advantages have been provided to clients and simultaneously, com-
petitors of clients were frequently punished by unfavourable regulation. This is 
most clearly visible in the example of punishing certain representatives of multi-
national businesses by selective disadvantages (extra taxes, exclusive regulation), 
while other members of the same community were rewarded and included in the 
close circle of the strategic partners of the Hungarian government. The simulta-
neous steps in opposite directions can be interpreted as a deliberate policy aimed 
at splitting the established business networks (that of foreign companies/multi-
national business). Using Schoenman’s typology, this is a move towards narrow 
networks and the patronage state (business capture), since political uncertainty is 
perceived as very low by the government since FIDESZ won elections twice in 
succession with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  
These cases illustrate the departure from the “competition state” (Drahokoupil 
2008). The concept of the illiberal state decreases the free market system and 
democratic institutions. The above cases as well as the whole departure process 
from Western values has been conceptualised in Hungary and is therefore regard-
ed by the Hungarian government as a sovereign decision to establish a new eco-
nomic system. Populist followers of the Hungarian agenda can be found also in 
Poland. The PiS party openly declared his appreciation of the concept, declaring 
that hopefully there will come a time when there will be a Budapest in Warsaw. 
But the essence of the opinion of Polish observers is that the concept of economic 
patriotism has already been introduced in Poland as well. This is reflected, among 
others, by the changes in state ownership policies. 
12  Until 2014, construction tenders were won to a very high degree by the companies of Lajos 
Simicska, an old friend and former treasurer of FIDESZ. He criticised the government rather 
vehemently in 2014 and, as a consequence, his companies were barred from participation in 
public procurement tenders for three years in 2015. This was a clear application of the selec-
tive advantage/disadvantage policy (see at various internet news portals, e.g. Origo 2016).  
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE RELEVANCE FOR THE CEE MODEL 
OF CAPITALISM
What message does this analysis deliver to the concept of the CEE model of capi-
talism? I believe that changes in political attitudes have an important role in the 
model. Increasing direct state intervention in the economy changes the rules of 
the game rather quickly in ways that were described in the paper. Weaker social 
institutions and deliberate government policies aimed at increasing discretional 
decisions and limiting transparency will limit also the area of the rule of law. 
Uncertain and increasingly arbitrary business conditions will influence not only 
domestic, but also foreign owners in their operations in CEE. Foreign firms’ role 
as an anchor of the economy may decline, as they either change their operations 
or leave the region if they are unwilling to adjust. Contrary to the assumption of 
the DME model, I think that governments can also influence multinational firms’ 
activities either for good or bad as was evidenced by the Hungarian cases cited 
in the paper. Governments may try to use the fuzziness of conditions to their ad-
vantage, sometimes even at the risk of the withdrawal of foreign companies. This 
policy is easily sold to societies by populist statements of their governments. 
The populist argument frequently refers to the fact that there are good exam-
ples of successful and efficient SOEs. Indeed, the idea of incorporating SOEs into 
the economic system is not from devil. I do not think, however, that SOEs’ role 
in CEE models is identical with any of the other European capitalist models. 
We should not forget the conditions for adequate SOE activity, which is effective 
social, political, and economic control. Moreover, state companies must support 
economic policies in deliberate ways. However, SOEs in CEE are used by politi-
cians rather for political and personal rent-seeking. This threatens the social ac-
ceptance of basic market economic institutions and the rule of law. Strengthening 
control institutions over public policies in general is a precondition of maintain-
ing democratic values and withholding the pendulum from further moving to au-
tocracy. Controlled direct state intervention in the economy should serve public 
welfare and not private interest.   
Therefore, a further lesson for the CEE model is the outstanding importance 
of social and political control institutions. CEE models implicitly assumed that 
foreign control can withhold governments from flirting with illiberal political 
and economic solutions. It seems that this control lost its efficiency after 2004. 
The loosening of democratic control tempted ambitious politicians to move the 
economic and political system away from traditional Western norms towards an 
authoritarian model more typical in the East. In fact, this type of shuttling be-
tween East and West, democracy and autocracy has always been characteristic of 
the region’s countries. The greatest harm is caused by the shuttling itself because 
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it is always linked to sizeable institutional changes, which are always very costly. 
But even more damage is caused by the unreliable, constantly changing environ-
ment that makes long-term business planning impossible. From the viewpoint of 
doing business, a predictable environment with some secure institutions (security 
of property rights) may be more valued even in an autocracy. 
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